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0 Introduction  
 
I’ll start with a metaphysical creed—four propositions. I’m confident that the first three are 
true, and I suspect that the fourth is true, but I don't think one has to accept any of them to 
agree with my principal thesis—the thesis of the primacy of panpsychism, the highly 
unoriginal thesis that there are compelling reasons for favouring panpsychism above all 
other positive substantive proposals about the fundamental nature of concrete reality. 
 I’ll state the four propositions first in German because I like the way they sound in 
German. [1] Stoff ist Kraft, [2] Wesen ist Werden, [3] Sein ist Sosein, [4] Ansichsein ist 
Fürsichsein. These are identity claims—fully reversible. I’m not going to argue for them 
but I’ll provide a few glosses.1 
 
1 Stoff ist Kraft   
 
[1] Stoff ist Kraft. 
 
Matter is force or as I will say energy:  
 
[1] matter is energy.  
 
Strictly speaking matter is only one form of concrete being, but I’ll use the word loosely to 
mean all concrete stuff: all concrete being is energy—energy-activity, energy-stuff. 
 I’m using the word ‘energy’ as Heisenberg does when he writes that “energy is a 
substance”, “all particles are made of the same substance: energy” (1958: 63, 71), and 
putting aside the common use according to which ‘energy’ denotes the power of ‘doing 
work’ contained in or possessed by a body or system of bodies. 
 I take this general position to be orthodoxy today. It’s also an old view, if Aristotelian 
energeia can be understood as energy: “in Aristotle the concept energeia coincides with 
that of reality. And Leibniz, too, declared: ‘quod non agit, non existit’” (Schlick 1918-25, 
181): what doesn’t act doesn’t exist.  The most fundamental characterization of substance is 
that which acts: “activity … is of the essence of substance” (Leibniz 1714, 65).2   
                                                                                                                                               
1 In this paper I’m concerned with concrete being—the universe. I don't know whether it’s helpful to say that 
there is abstract being, as opposed to and in addition to concrete being, but I’m going to put this question 
aside.  
2 See also, strikingly, Faraday (1844, 140ff), Bohm (1957, §1.6), and many others (when I cite a work I give 
the date of first publication, or occasionally the date of composition, while the page reference is to the edition 
listed in the bibliography). I’m inclined to include Plato, who holds (c 360 BCE, 247d-e) that “being is 
nothing other than dunamis”, i.e. potency, power, force. But this would need to be vigorously argued, given 
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 Some may find the equation of force, energy, power, and activity too quick or easy. I 
think it’s eminently defensible—the evolution of the old notions dunamis and energeia into 
the notions of dynamism and energy is highly significant. I also take it that the existence of 
causation—of the “because something is, something else must be” phenomenon as it 
concretely exists in nature3—is nothing over and above the existence of energy. One might 
say that the causal laws for our universe describe the particular form of energy as it exists 
in our universe—the behavioural form of energy as it exists in our universe.4 
 If spacetime is itself a concrete existent, something substantival, as I’m inclined to 
suppose along with many others, rather than a mere container for concrete being, and if it is 
in fact the only concrete existent, as a good number of physicists and cosmologists suppose, 
if in other words spacetime is the universe, if 
 
[A] Sein ist Raumzeit,  
 
if [A] being is spacetime—then, given [1], spacetime is energy.5 If the existence of 
spacetime is the existence of certain fields (electromagnetic, weak and strong nuclear, 
gravitational, Higgs), or ultimately only one field, then the existence of the field or fields is 
just a matter of the existence of energy.6 
 We may be wildly wrong about the nature of spacetime, insofar as our conception of 
spacetime goes in any way beyond our best equations—even if our best equations  are 
essentially correct. So be it. I’ll take the word ‘spacetime’ to be a name for the actual 
dimensionality of reality, the actual existence-dimension or Existenzraum of concrete 
reality whatever its ultimate nature—a term that leaves room for the possibility (the 
likelihood) that we are in certain ways bewilderingly wrong about it.  
 One point is worth noting straight away (I’ll return to it later). We certainly shouldn’t 
suppose that having spatial existence entails having some sort of irreducible non-
experiential being any more than we should suppose something we already know to be false 
(given that there is space): that having spatial existence is incompatible with experiential 
being. 
 I’m inclined to think that [1] is at bottom an a priori truth. Aristotle didn't wait for it to 
be presented as a scientific discovery. The once popular idea of inert or powerless concrete 
                                                                                                                                               
the way in which Plato distinguishes between dunamis, potency, and energeia, actuality. 
3 Kant 1781–7: B288. Kant’s formulation is entirely general and can be taken non-temporally. 
4 The existence of power can’t be equated with the existence of something ‘merely’ dispositional—given one 
common understanding of the word ‘disposition’. Just as there’s no energy without power so there’s no power 
without actual, live energy (it would be superficial to think that the existence of vis inertiae doesn’t involve 
the existence of energy). 
5 I’ll use letters rather than numbers for primary propositions that I don't positively endorse in this paper 
although I think some of them may be true. 
6 Descartes endorses [A] with respect to the material world. Samuel Alexander endorses it quite generally: 
“Space-Time is the stuff of which matter and all things are specifications” (Alexander 1924, vi). I’m leaving 
aside the ‘relational’ conception of space because no one has ever managed to make any sense of it as a 
metaphysical position. 
 3 
being is I believe incoherent,7 and the natural thought that powers require ‘categorical 
grounds’ doesn’t require one to think that there is or can be any ‘real distinction’, in 
Descartes’s sense, between a thing’s possession of the powers it possesses and the existence 
of those powers’ categorical grounds, or that the existence of the categorical grounds can’t 
be wholly a matter of the existence of energy. Granted that you can’t have powers without 
‘categorical grounds’, so too you can’t have categorical grounds without powers. Imagine 
an exhaustive specification of a thing x’s powers P and categorical properties C (the 
specification of powers will be—benignly—infinite if it’s given in terms of x’s possible 
effects on other things). It’s plausible that only something identical to x in respect of C can 
possibly have precisely P and conversely that anything identical to x in respect of C must 
have precisely P. In this case neither C nor P can possibly exist apart from the other, so 
there’s no real distinction between them in Descartes’s sense, and where there’s no real 
distinction between two things it’s plausible that they’re really identical. 
 So much for the first proposition. 
 
2 Wesen ist Werden 
 
[2] Wesen ist Werden, 
 
i.e.  
 
[2] being is becoming.  
 
This is the essential (Wesen) nature of concrete being, of nature (Wesen). Everything is 
process in other familiar terms. Being is process. Being is doing, activity. A through-and-
through processual view of reality is mandatory. All concrete being is essentially time-
being—whatever exactly time is. Being is being. All being is in Kant’s phrase ‘always 
already’ behaving, becoming, and of course conversely (Kant 1781–7, A346/B404).  
[1] and [2] are close to  
 
[5] Wirklich ist, was wirkt 
 
—the actual is what has an effect.8 In the case of matter, Schopenhauer observes, “its being 
[Daseyn] is its acting [Wirken]: and it is inconceivable that matter has any other being”.9 To 
say this is not to ‘desubstantialize’ matter in any way, and it is most emphatically not to 
suggest that matter is really only what we can possibly observe (as per the fatal modern 
tendency to epistemologize metaphysics). It’s simply to express in a certain way the point 
                                                                                                                                               
7 See Strawson (forthcoming b)  
8 “Wirklich ist, was wirkt, was eine Macht, eine Potenz ist” (Frauenstädt 1840, 341). 
9 Schopenhauer 1819–59, §1.4; matter is “causality itself, objectively conceived” (Schopenhauer 1819-59, 
§2.1.4); “matter is throughout pure Causality, its essence is Action in general” (Schopenhauer 1813, 97). 
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that the nature of concrete being is energy. The point is old, but we periodically lose hold of 
it. David Lewis has misled many with his extraordinary view (perhaps a legacy of 
positivistic empiricism) that the intrinsic nature of matter is or could be independent of its 
behaviour.10 (You can’t vary the laws of nature while keeping the nature of a thing 
constant, because the laws are essentially constitutive of its nature.) 
 So much very briefly for [2]. There is of course a great deal more to be said about this. 
 
3 Sein ist Sosein  
 
[3] Sein ist Sosein.  
 
This is harder to render in a single English sentence. I propose  
 
[3] being is quality.  
 
There’s no metaphysically fundamental distinction between substance and attribute (as 
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, and many others agree). There’s no 
metaphysically fundamental distinction between the concrete being of substance, ‘thatness’, 
and the concrete being of (intrinsic) propertiedness, ‘howness’, ‘thusness’, qualitativity. 
There is no real distinction, in Descartes’s terms, between a concrete entity’s Sein and its 
Sosein, when that entity is considered at any particular time. There’s no difference between 
bare being (the barest that being can get) and how-being: between being and being-some-
way. Lewis is again wrong to suppose that a thing’s behaviour (in any given context) could 
fail to be wholly a function of its intrinsic nature, for a thing’s behaviour in any given 
context is simply (and wholly) part of its being, its intrinsic nature. He is, however, right, 
on the present view, that concrete reality is “an arrangement of qualities. And that is all” 
(Lewis 1986, x). 
 It’s obvious that there can’t be Sein without Sosein or Sosein without Sein. To be at all is 
necessarily to be somehow, and to be somehow is necessarily to exist. The present stronger 
claim—that there’s no real distinction, in the case of any particular thing or object o, 
considered at any particular time t, between the totality of what constitutes the existence of 
o at t and the totality of what constitutes the existence of the (intrinsic instantiated) 
propertiedness of o at that time—may seem less obvious, but it’s no less secure. Neither o 
at t nor o’s (intrinsic instantiated) propertiedness at t can coherently be supposed to exist 
apart from the other in any respect at all, let the counterfactuals fall as they may. They are 
metaphysically identical—the same thing. We can express this as a subthesis of [3]: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
10 Two quick points on this view. [1] You can’t vary the nomic circumstances of a thing x—the laws of nature 
governing x—while keeping x’s nature constant, because the laws are essentially constitutive of its nature. [2] 
Even if you could, there would be no independence of behaviour from intrinsic nature. For x would behave in 
the way it did, say W1, in nomic circumstances N1, wholly because of its intrinsic nature, and it would 
behave in way W2 in nomic circumstances N2 wholly because of its intrinsic nature; etc. 
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[3*] An object considered at any given time t = its (intrinsic instantiated concrete) 
propertiedness at t. 
 
The way in which object words and property words operate in everyday thought means that 
this outright identity statement can sound plainly incorrect. In particular, the ease and 
naturalness with which we use counterfactual idioms when talking about objects and their 
properties can mislead us. We may for example be tempted to think that it is a sufficient 
objection to [3*] to say something like: ‘This very object considered now at t could have 
had different properties now at t from the properties it does in fact have’. In fact this is no 
objection to [3*], but it can take a certain amount of effort to rethink one’s conception of 
the phenomena that lead us to talk of objects, on the one hand, and the phenomena that lead 
us to talk of instantiated properties, on the other hand, up to the point at which [3*] no 
longer seems incorrect, but rather evidently true.11 
Kant gets this exactly right, I think, when he says that “in their relation to substance, 
accidents [or properties] are not really subordinated to it, but are the mode of existing of the 
substance itself” (Kant 1781-7, A414/B441). There’s no sort of ontic subordinacy of the 
object’s properties to the object itself, no sort of existential inequality or priority or 
superiority or inferiority of any sort, no ontic dependence of either on the other, no 
independence of either from the other. In the case of any concrete entity, again, its Sosein 
(its being the way it is) is identical to its Sein (its being). 
 I take this claim to be a priori, however much language beguiles us to think otherwise. 
There is really no other possible relation of thatness to howness. But it is also perhaps the 
hardest of the four claims to grasp. Or rather it’s the hardest to hold onto in such a way as 
to be able to deploy it properly in one’s philosophical thinking. One can lose a theoretically 
live grasp of it when one isn’t concentrating even if one endorses it whenever one focuses 
on it without trying to do anything else. I think this is principally because of our deep 
natural tendency to think of objects and their properties in counterfactual ways. These ways 
of thinking are perfectly in order, and crucial for many ordinary purposes but they pull 
against [3] and [3*] in a way that can easily throw us off track in metaphysics. 
 So much for the third proposition. 
 
4 Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein  
 
[4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein.  
 
For something to be, to be at all, to be what it is considered wholly in itself or an sich in 
Kant’s sense, is essentially for it to be for itself, in the familiar sense of this phrase 
                                                                                                                                               
11 See Strawson (2008, 279-281). We lose hold of the key point if we take the identity claim in [3*] to be just 
a version of the ‘bundle’ theory of objects. The bundle theory of objects as standardly presented will always 
seem intuitively unacceptable, and rightly so, because it retains the everyday conception of, and distinction 
between, ‘object’ and ‘property’—the very conception that is undermined by insight into the identity claim. 
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according to which for a being to be ‘for itself’ is for there to be something it is like to be it, 
experientially. It is for it to be a conscious or experiencing being. So  
 
[4] being is mind. 
 
Being is experience, experientiality. [4] is a form of panpsychism or panexperientialism (I 
use these terms interchangeably, taking the psychical to be essentially a matter of 
conscious—experiential—goings-on).12 It’s equivalent to 
 
[6] Sein ist Bewusstsein. 
 
It’s a form of pure panpsychism, the view that experientiality is all there is to the intrinsic 
nature of concrete reality (note that on this view, the existence of subjects of experience 
can’t be supposed to be anything ontologically over and above the existence of 
experiencing). The milder version says that this is how things are in this universe. The 
stronger version says that this is all that being can be—that panpsychism is necessarily true. 
I think this may be so—that concrete being has in fact no other possible form than energy, 
and that energy has in fact no other possible form than experientiality. But it certainly isn’t 
a priori viewed from here. We can’t hope to prove that the notion of non-experiential 
concrete being is incoherent, even if it’s a priori in God’s physics, or rather his entirely 
general theory of being, his ‘concretics’, his necessarily utterly comprehensive account of 
what can concretely exist.  Still, the great William James holds that “our only intelligible 
notion of an object in itself is that it should be an object for itself”, and that “a thing in itself 
… must be an experience for itself” (Perry 1935, 446). (See §21 below for a suggestion 
about why this might be so.) 
 
5 The Basic Creed 
 
So here’s the basic creed: being is energy, process, quality, mind. These four things are, in 
this universe, all the same thing—which may be spacetime (in which case there is no real 
distinction between concrete being and its Existenzraum or dimensionality). Once the 
restriction to concrete being is in place the four initial terms—Stoff, Wesen, Sein, 
Ansichsein—come to the same thing: Wirklichkeit—the actual. That’s the proposal. It’s the 
backbone of the metaphysics I favour: identity metaphysics. The principal characteristic of 
identity metaphysics is that it finds identity where other metaphysical positions, dancing to 
the panpipes of language, find distinctness and difference. In the background stand 
powerful thinkers—Spinoza, Leibniz, James, Nietzsche among others, perhaps also 
Whitehead—although none, perhaps, would accept the whole of the basic creed 
                                                                                                                                               
12 ‘Psyche’ was a mass term before it was a count noun. The term ‘panpsychism’ doesn’t imply that there are 
subjects of experience in addition to experiential reality, or that everything that exists involves the existence 
of a subject of experience in addition to the existence of experiential reality. 
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unreservedly. 
 Perhaps I should say that I’m not arguing, so I’m not begging questions. I’m offering a 
picture of how things are. 
 
6 Natura Non Facit Saltum: No Radical Emergence  
 
Let me now add an ancient metaphysical thesis to the ontological theses [1]–[6]:  
 
[7] natura non facit saltum. 
 
I take [7]—No Jumps—to be a solid part of any sound naturalism, and from [7], as I 
understand it, one can derive the No Radical Emergence thesis as I understand it, i.e.  
 
[8] there is no radical emergence 
 
(some may think that [8] is effectively the same as [7]). And from [8], I submit, we can 
derive 
 
[9] the experiential (experiential being) can’t emerge from the wholly and utterly non-
experiential (wholly and utterly non-experiential being) 
 
—because any such emergence would have to be radical in the impossible way. 
I’m not going to argue for [8] and [9]. The general idea is simple. Emergence—e-
mergence, no less—can’t be brute. In all genuine (non-radical) cases of emergence of one 
thing from another there’s a fundamental sense in which the emergent phenomenon, say Y, 
is wholly dependent on—somehow wholly flows from—that which it emerges from, say X. 
Otherwise it simply won’t be true after all to say that Y is emergent from X, for some part 
or aspect of Y will have come from somewhere else. (I understand emergence in what I 
take to be a standard way as paradigmatically a matter of constitution, not causation: in the 
present case, it would be a matter of individually non-experiential phenomena coming to 
constitute experiential phenomena simply by coming together or being arranged in a certain 
way—as non-liquid H2O molecules together come to constitute something liquid.)13  
Many will agree. Others won’t. Two things seem worth saying straight away. The first 
is that it’s metaphysically far more extravagant and anti-naturalistic to reject [7] the No 
Jumps thesis, and postulate radical emergence of the experiential from the non-experiential, 
than it is to postulate non-radical emergence of the human experiential from the non-human 
experiential—whatever difficulties the second idea may also seem to raise (e.g. the 
‘combination problem’—see §19 below). 
Secondly, and more importantly, one doesn’t need to meet those who don't agree with 
                                                                                                                                               
13 For some arguments see Strawson (2006, 60-7); see also Seager (2012). Compare Jackson’s arguments for 
‘a priori physicalism’ (see e.g. Jackson 2003). 
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No Radical Emergence with an argument to support it. All one has to do is ask them 
politely why they think anything non-experiential exists; especially when this belief forces 
them to endorse radical emergence, given that they’re realists about experience. 
On this more later. First, some more declarations. 
 
7 Real Naturalism  
 
Like many, I’m a monist, a stuff monist, an only one-kind-of-stuff monist:  
 
[10] stuff/kind monism is true. 
 
I’m putting aside only-one-thing monism, thing monism, according to which  
 
[B] there is only one thing (object, entity, substance) in concrete reality, 
 
for purposes of discussion, although, like many, I’m attracted to one version of it, i.e. [A]: 
the view that spacetime is a single thing—the universe.14 
 
I’m not only a stuff monist. Like many again, I’m a materialist or physicalist monist (I use 
the words ‘materialist’ and ‘physicalist’ interchangeably)—someone who holds that 
everything that concretely exists in our universe is wholly physical: 
 
[11] materialism/physicalism is true. 
 
I also take it that everything that concretely exists is wholly natural—in no way 
supernatural or non-natural. So I’m an outright ontological naturalist.15 
I am however a real naturalist, a real materialist—unlike some who call themselves 
‘naturalists’. I don’t disagree with them because they believe in the existence of something 
I judge to be supernatural. On the contrary: I disagree with them because, overtly or (more 
often) covertly, they doubt or deny the existence of a wholly natural concrete phenomenon 
we know to exist: the phenomenon of consciousness—conscious experience—experiential 
‘what-it’s-likeness’—the phenomenological character of experience—the subjective 
qualitative character of experience. I understand all these five common phrases to denote 
the same thing, which I’ll call ‘experience’, instead of ‘consciousness’, because the word 
‘consciousness’ has been used in too many different ways. 
 So I’m an outright realist about experience, a real realist about experience: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
14 Descartes holds [B] with respect to concrete material reality; Spinoza holds it with respect to all concrete 
reality. Among those who endorse this view today are Horgan and Potrč (2008). Schaffer calls this view 
‘existence monism’ (see e.g. Schaffer 2007; 2010). 
15 I’m putting aside ethics where I’m not a naturalist—if being a moral realist excludes being a naturalist.  
 9 
[12] there is experiential concrete reality.16 
 
Any real naturalist must be a real realist about experience, because experience is the most 
certainly known concretely existing general natural phenomenon, and is indeed the first 
thing any scientist encounters when they try to do science. 
 I say that I’m a real realist about experience because some who claim to be realists about 
experience aren’t really any such thing. What do I mean by real realism about experience? 
The quickest way to say what it is is to say that it’s to hold exactly the same general view 
about what experience is (colour experience, say, or pain experience, or taste experience), 
considered specifically as experience, that one held before one did any philosophy, e.g. 
when one was thirteen or ten or six. One then had an entirely correct view. If people ask 
what that view is I’ll ask them to think back to their childhood. If they say they still don't 
know I won’t believe them. 
 So I’m a real naturalist and a real materialist—a materialist in the sense in which every 
single materialist was a materialist until some time well into the twentieth century. That is, 
I’m someone who thinks that everything that exists is wholly physical and who is also fully 
realist about experience or consciousness. At the same time I know that ‘physical’ is a 
‘natural-kind’ term, like ‘gold’, or ‘tiger’, and that we may be very ignorant (or plain 
wrong) about the nature of the physical in various ways—if and insofar as the physical is 
anything more than experience. So really the core meaning of ‘physical’ for me is just: 
‘concretely real’. 
 But in that case why do I say I’m a materialist? Because I believe that  
 
[13] the claims of physics apply to everything that concretely exists 
 
and also that 
 
[14] many of the claims of physics are true of everything that concretely exists 
 
(e.g. f = ma, the inverse square laws, etc.). And I also know something that was a 
philosophical commonplace in the early twentieth century, and indeed earlier, and is 
fortunately becoming one again. I know that physics is “just a set of rules and equations”, 
in Hawking’s words (Hawking 1988, 174).17 I know that 
 
[15] physics can’t characterize the intrinsic non-structural nature of concrete reality in any 
respect at all  
 
                                                                                                                                               
16 One can always substitute the word ‘consciousness’ if one wishes. 
17 See also Greg Rosenberg (1999; 2004) and Ladyman et al. (2007). Compare Descartes: “all the properties” 
of material things “which I clearly and distinctly understand are … comprised within the subject matter of 
pure mathematics” (Descartes 1641, 2.55). Poincaré puts the point very vividly in ch. 10 of Science and 
Hypothesis (1903). 
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and a fortiori that  
 
[16] physics has no terms with which to characterize the intrinsic experiential-qualitative 
nature of concrete reality, 
 
whether only part of concrete reality has an experiential-qualitative nature, as we usually 
suppose, or whether all of it does, as panpsychists suppose. I know that physics is simply 
silent on the question of the intrinsic non-structural nature of reality.  
 We ordinarily suppose that we have some positive non-structural conception of the 
intrinsic nature of space or spacetime. So be it—so long as we’re clear that this conception 
of space or spacetime goes beyond anything that the equations of physics tell us. One of the 
greatest difficulties that arise in the metaphysics of mind is precisely that we standardly and 
perhaps irrepressibly suppose that physics supports the accuracy of our basic imaginative 
picture (I mean ‘imaginative’ literally) of what spatiality is—and of what matter is.  
 So physics is silent about the intrinsic non-structural nature of reality. The question is 
then this (it’s an ancient question, but I’ll give it again in Hawking’s words): “What is it 
that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?” (Hawking 
1988, 174). What is it that the equations are true of? What is the fundamental, intrinsic, 
non-structural nature of the concrete reality that the true statements of physics are true of?  
 Call this fundamental intrinsic non-structural nature x. The relevant options are (i) x is 
wholly experiential (the pure panpsychist option), and (ii) x is partly experiential and partly 
non-experiential (as most people suppose). I’m ignoring the third option, (iii) x is wholly 
non-experiential, because it denies the existence of experience.18 The central claim of this 
paper is that (i) is the best option—that panpsychism is the most plausible theory of x, 
given a naturalist—materialist monist—outlook. 
 I’ll now flag an assumption that is built into the question, and then make one more 
general metaphysical assumption specifically for the purposes of discussion. 
 
8 Two more Assumptions  
 
The assumption built into the question is that for any concrete entity x one can always 
distinguish between x’s structural features and something about x that isn’t just a matter of 
structure, something in virtue of which x has or exemplifies the structure it does, something 
that is therefore not itself just a matter of structure. 
 The assumption can seem very secure but it has been questioned. Ontic structural 
realists19 claim precisely that structure is all that concretely exists: 
 
                                                                                                                                               
18 All theories that claim to give a reductive account of experience in terms of non-experiential phenomena—
e.g. behaviourism in all its forms and all full-on versions of functionalism—deny the existence of experience. 
They claim not to on the ground that reduction is not elimination; but reduction is elimination in this case (see 
Strawson forthcoming a). 
19 See e.g. Ladyman et al. (2007). 
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[C] concrete being is (wholly a matter of) structure. 
 
And while Max Newman’s claim that “it seems necessary to give up the ‘structure–quality’ 
division of knowledge in its strict form” (Newman 1928, 147) is an epistemological claim, 
it may be thought to point forward to an ontological proposal. 
 If one takes take the structural properties of a concrete thing x to be properties that can be 
fully characterized in abstract, logico-mathematical terms, as I do, then I think one can 
safely conclude that [C] must be false. One can conclude that there must be more to x than 
merely its structural properties, on the seemingly secure ground that there must be more to 
concrete being than abstract being.20 If, however, one understands structure in a richer way 
as something concrete—as ‘causal structure’ or ‘spacetime structure’ or (in a 
Schopenhauerian-Russellian fashion) ‘spacetimecause structure’—then one may be able to 
link [C] to [A], and also—via the power-energy-causality equation—to the basic creed [1]-
[5].21 
 The further assumption that I’m going to make for the purposes of discussion is that 
 
[D] there are a great many ultimate constituents of physical reality. 
 
[D] is sometimes called ‘smallism’.22 It’s very widely accepted, but—as is now clear—I’m 
not sure it’s true. It would obviously be false if any version of [B] (thing monism) were 
true, and although it seems extraordinarily difficult to understand how any version of [B] 
could be true, given the seemingly evident and irreducible plurality of concrete things, it 
may yet be, as already remarked, that [A] there is a fundamental sense in which spacetime 
is indeed the only thing there is, and that all the particle phenomena recognized in the 
current standard model are just “various modes of vibration of tiny one-dimensional rips in 
spacetime known as strings” (Weinberg 1997, 20). On another thing-monist view, the wave 
function is the only thing that exists. 
 Nevertheless I’ll assume [D] at this point, for many philosophers believe it to be true. 
They also take it to give rise to a special and acute difficulty for any panpsychist theory: the 
so-called ‘combination problem’. So they might not be impressed by any argument for the 
primacy of panpsychism that assumed [B], thing monism, and so assumed that [D] was 
false. 
 
9 The Hylal 
 
With this in place, consider the proposal that  
 
                                                                                                                                               
20 Ladyman and Ross appear to bite this bullet: “we reject the dichotomy between the abstract and the 
concrete, and between the substantival and the structural” (Ladyman et al. 2007, 186). 
21 It’s also arguable that [C] entails [B] on the ground that the universe must be correctly describable as a 
single structure if [C] is true. 
22 See e.g. Wilson (2004), Coleman (2006). 
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[17] experientiality is one possible fundamental kind of stuff and non-experientiality is 
another. 
 
 This seems unexceptionable at first. ‘Experiential’ and ‘non-experiential’ are mutually 
exclusive high-level type terms or ‘kind-determinables’ both of which, we may suppose, 
can have very different more determinate values.23 We know this is so in the case of 
experiential stuff, in having sound experience, colour-experience, taste-experience, and so 
on, and we naturally assume it may also be so in the case of non-experiential stuff. We take 
it that there is wholly non-experiential stuff in our universe and the supposition that there 
might be radically different kinds of wholly non-experiential stuff (X-stuff, Y-stuff, Z-
stuff) in other possible universes seems plainly coherent.24 
 There is however an asymmetry when it comes to our understanding of the experiential 
and our understanding of the non-experiential. In the case of experience we have a positive 
grasp of the sense in which all possible experience is, simply in being experience, the same 
fundamental kind of thing. Even if the particular qualitative character of Martian 
experience is radically unimaginable by us we still have a firm positive grasp of the 
fundamental kind of thing it is simply in knowing in general what experience is. When we 
consider the non-experiential, by contrast, we suppose that we could possibly have a good 
grasp of the fundamental nature of the local non-experiential stuff while really having no 
idea at all about the fundamental nature of X-stuff or Y-stuff or Z-stuff in other possible 
worlds. We know what experience is in an extremely general but still positively substantive 
way that allows us to see that experientiality constitutes a single fundamental kind, a single 
fundamental natural kind—a single fundamental qualitative kind, one might say, using 
‘qualitative’ in a natural highly general way that has nothing specially to do with 
experience. The trouble is that we don't know what the non-experiential is in the same sort 
of way, a way that allows us to say that it constitutes a single fundamental natural kind. 
 It’s not hard to see why this is so: it’s that we don't have a positive, substantive, general 
conception of the non-experiential at all. ‘Non-experiential’ is a merely negative, 
maximally general word that can as far as we know sweep up radical qualitative differences 
that don't fall under a single qualitative kind in the way that all kinds of experience 
knowably do.  
 How can we adjust the proposal so that it concerns two genuine fundamental kinds? It 
suffices to relativize the experiential/non-experiential opposition to a particular universe, 
e.g. our own, replacing the maximally general negative term ‘non-experiential’ by a more 
specific positive term that denotes the particular fundamental kind of non-experiential stuff 
we take ourselves to encounter in our actual world. 
 Which term will suit? We obviously can’t use the term ‘physical’ or ‘material’, as real 
materialists who hold that experientiality is wholly physical. I propose ‘hylal’, derived from 
                                                                                                                                               
23 Compare ‘colour’, ‘shape’, and ‘animal’, each of which have many more determinate ‘values’—‘red’, 
‘blue’, ‘round’, ‘square’, ‘cat’, ‘dog’. 
24 It may be, in fact, that non-experiential concrete stuff is not possible. I’ll consider this suggestion at the end. 
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the old Greek word for wood, which came to be used as a general term for matter conceived 
of as something entirely non-experiential (consider Berkeley’s ‘Hylas’). All we need to 
stipulate for present purposes is that ‘x is or has hylal being’ entails ‘x is or has non-
experiential being’—whatever else is or isn’t true of x.  
 
10 Experiential-Hylal Monism? 
 
With the term ‘hylal’ in place, [18] becomes 
 
[18] experientiality is one possible fundamental kind of stuff and hylality is another. 
 
We can then consider the proposal that 
 
[19] reality may be fundamentally both experiential and hylal in nature 
 
– where this is put forward as a stuff-monist proposal. On this view, the fundamental 
natural intrinsic properties of concrete reality include both experiential and hylal (hence 
non-experiential) properties, even though [10] stuff monism is true. When we consider 
physical stuff, the only fundamental kind of stuff there is, we find both experiential stuff 
and hylal stuff. 
 If [10] stuff monism is true, as we are assuming, [18] rules out [19]. For if [18] is true, 
[19] posits two fundamental kinds of stuff and is a version of dualism. So if one wants to 
continue to be a monist, and a real realist about experience, and hang on to non-experiential 
stuff, in this case hylal stuff, as many do (it’s the only way to resist panpsychism), one has 
to suppose that the single fundamental kind of stuff may be fundamentally both-
experiential-and-non-experiential in nature: that experientiality and non-experientiality, 
although essentially opposed, can possibly co-exist as a single kind of stuff.25 
 I’ll call this position ‘experiential-hylal monism’—‘EH monism’ for short: ‘E’ for 
experiential and ‘H’ for ‘hylal’. Is EH monism possible? We can see straight away that no 
portion of E being can be H being, given that being H entails being non-E. And here I think 
we see the gain in clarity of giving up ‘property’ talk for ‘being’ talk. 
 Objection: It isn’t a gain in clarity. It’s an occlusion of a crucial metaphysical possibility. 
Of course H being can’t be E being, but a portion of concrete being can possess both E 
properties and H properties. This is plain even when we restrict attention to ‘fundamental 
                                                                                                                                               
25 This is Regius’s suggestion, and there is little doubt that he is reporting a view that Descartes also 
entertained: ‘some philosophers … hold that consciousness [cogitatio] and extension are attributes which are 
present in certain substances, as in subjects; [and] since these attributes are not opposites but [merely] 
different, there is no reason why the mental [consciousness experience] should not be an attribute of some sort 
co-existing with extension in the same subject, though the one [attribute] is not included in the concept of the 
other. For whatever we can conceive of can exist. Now, it is conceivable that the mental is something of this 
sort; for it does not imply a contradiction. Therefore it is possible that the mental is something of this sort. So 
those who assert that we clearly and distinctly conceive human mentality as necessarily really distinct [in 
Descartes’s sense] from body are mistaken’ (Regius 1647: 294–5). 
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natural intrinsic’ properties, as you are doing here. Look, a human being can possess both E 
and H parts and properties. 
Well, this could possibly be true of human beings—if there is some H stuff in our 
universe (so that pure panpsychism is false). But, first, it directly begs the question to say 
that it’s obviously true because human beings certainly have both experiential properties 
and spatial properties, if one understands ‘spatial’ in the ordinary way according to which 
spatial properties are essentially or at least certainly non-experiential properties. Our 
ignorance of the nature of the spatial rules out this proposal—even apart from the tendency 
among leading cosmologists to deny that spacetime exists. 
Secondly, even if it could be true that things like human beings possess both E 
properties and H properties, I don't think it could true in such a way that EH monism is or 
could be true. This, I think, is precisely one of the places where property talk leads us 
grievously astray. It beguiles us into believing in the coherence of metaphysical 
possibilities that are in fact illusory, given Sein ist Sosein. It seems to allow for the 
possibility that a portion of concrete being may possess both fundamental natural intrinsic 
E properties and fundamental natural intrinsic H properties without being ultimately wholly 
factorable into wholly E portions and wholly H portions. In that case, however, some not-
further-factorable or ultimate parts are both irreducibly E and irreducibly H, i.e. impossibly, 
irreducibly both E stuff and non-E stuff.  
Sein ist Sosein shows up the impossibility. Whatever one thinks about how properties 
may possibly co-exist, concrete being is wholly qualitativity, concrete qualitativity, 
according to Sein ist Sosein, and E qualitativity can’t be non-E qualitativity and conversely. 
So E qualitativity and H qualitativity can’t possibly coexist in one non-factorable portion of 
being (a portion of being that isn’t ultimately made up of distinct non-overlapping portions 
of E qualitativity and H qualitativity). In order to do this they would need something—the 
object-as-opposed-to-the-properties, the ‘subject’ or ‘bearer’ of the properties—that ‘has’ 
them and that is not itself wholly a matter of qualitativity. But there is no such thing—for 
Sein ist Sosein.  
If this is right, EH monism fails. The attempt to describe it while respecting Sein ist 
Sosein pushes us inexorably back to dualism.  
The picture will continue to appeal—the picture according to which a portion of single-
stuff being can have both E and H properties without being factorable into E portions and H 
portions. I think this is the way many aspiring real materialists tend to think—in a vague 
quasi-pictorial way—about neural goings-on that are experiential goings-on. It’s very easy 
to slip back into this, in my experience. One pictures the neural goings-on—the sweeping 
nets and waves of electrochemical activity flickering across great connected skeins of 
neurons—as having intrinsically irreducibly H (hence non-E) features. One then thinks that 
these intrinsically H goings-on are in at least some of their parts or features also E goings-
on. But Sein ist Sosein blocks this when it’s thought through. For again, and crudely, (i) 
things are in the end wholly ‘made of’ qualities (Sein ist Sosein), (ii) and E and H are 
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incompatible qualities, so (iii) nothing can be made of both at exactly the same place.26 
There’s wide scope for missing the point, given the plasticity of property talk. I can’t 
hope to meet all objections or convince those committed to the traditional conception of 
properties. I think many who count themselves as materialists will be unable to give up the 
idea that we know in some fundamental—perhaps Moorean—way what space is. (I was 
unable to give it up in Strawson 2003a, §8.) We are confident we know in some deep way 
what space is, however wrong we also are about it, and in particular know that spatial 
properties like shape properties are essentially non-E properties, and so know—given that 
we accept that experiences of red are brain states—that there are things that have both E 
properties and non-E properties. 
A first reply may be that a thing’s particular shape isn’t a matter of the intrinsic nature 
of the stuff it’s made of, and that we already know that experiential stuff can be spatial 
stuff. The main reply targets the presumption that a thing can’t possibly occupy space 
without having without some non-experiential being. This presumption is an inderacinable 
part of our fundamental intuitive conception of space, as just remarked, and some are too 
deeply committed to it to take seriously the possibility that it may be false—in spite of the 
fact that it’s under pressure in physics and cosmology. They will have to face the fact that it 
appears to be incompatible with any realistic (genuinely experience-acknowledging) 
version of stuff monism that retains the idea that concrete reality is spatial. 
 
11 The Untenability of Neutral Monism 
 
EH monism isn’t a version of neutral monism—the view, to quote Russell, that “both mind 
[E, on the present terms] and matter [H, on the present terms] are composed of a neutral-
stuff which, in isolation, is neither mental [E] nor material [H]” (Russell 1921, 25). It’s the 
precise opposite—not neutral monism but doubly committed monism, both-and monism as 
opposed to neither-nor neutral monism. What the two views have in common as monisms 
is that they want to accord the same reality status to E being and H being while remaining 
monist. 
Can neutral monism do better than EH monism in this respect? Could E and H be 
genuinely real properties of things while somehow emerging from some more fundamental 
underlying stuff which is neither E nor H but rather—let us say—عع (pronounced “ayn”), 
                                                                                                                                               
26 Objection: we allow that monism—physicalism—may be true even if there are irreducibly different 
(perhaps essentially non-interconvertible) ‘fundamental particles’. Why can’t we similarly allow that monism 
may be true when there are irreducibly different (essentially non-interconvertible) types of fundamental 
stuff—E stuff and H (non-E) stuff? 
The first reply is a question: why bother, given that there is no reason to posit H stuff? A further reply is 
that particles are emergent phenomena according to quantum field theory, plausibly all ‘made of’ the same 
kind of stuff. One can also question the non-interconvertibility of fundamental particles (see the discussion of 
‘fungibility’ in §16) and note that the view that the fundamental entities are strings with different vibrational 
characteristics creates no evident difficulty for stuff monism. More generally, we take ourselves to have 
strong reasons for holding that all the fundamental particles are of the same fundamental kind. In the case of E 
stuff and H stuff, by contrast, we know the fundamental nature of E stuff, and H stuff is defined as non-E. 
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where to be fundamentally عع is to be fundamentally both wholly non-E and wholly non-H? 
 The short answer is no, but I’ll spell it out a bit. عع can’t be neither E nor non-E, on pain 
of logical impossibility. And it has to be non-E, since it would otherwise be E, and so not 
neutral between E and H (it would also be panpsychist). عع must therefore be a kind of non-
E stuff which is different from H non-E stuff. There is no other possibility.  
 But this isn’t a real possibility on the present view. It’s ruled out by [7] No Jumps or 
equally [8] No Radical Emergence, which not only lead to 
 
[9] E stuff can’t emerge from wholly and utterly non-E stuff (e.g. عع) 
 
but also to 
 
[20] H stuff can’t emerge from wholly and utterly non-H stuff (e.g. عع) 
 
Objection:  How can you rule out the possibility that something is in itself wholly non-E 
and wholly non-H but is nonetheless genuinely protoexperiential and protohylal in such a 
way that E and H can emerge from it? After all, you yourself allow there are are deep 
respects in which we’re radically ignorant of the fundamental nature of things.27  
I admit our ignorance, but remain firm in my commitment to No Jumps and No Radical 
Emergence. The idea that something can be wholly non-experiential but nonetheless 
‘protoexperiential’ will always seem attractive. It is after all the standard view of the 
evolution of consciousness like ours, according to which biological experientiality (human 
or canine or feline, etc) evolved from wholly non-experiential origins. But No Jumps and 
No Radical Emergence are part of the deep structure of naturalism. We have no reason to 
believe that nature ever makes ontological jumps of the sort forbidden by [7] and we have 
very good reason to believe that it doesn’t.  
I don’t, however, need to make this move. All I need to do is to reissue the polite 
enquiry I made earlier. Why does anyone think anything non-experiential exists at all? I 
think the polite enquiry is devastating and I’ll return to it. I know that some will be 
unimpressed by it, and by the commitment to [7] and [8], so it’s fortunate that there’s 
another way of showing the inadequacy of neutral monism. 
The term ‘neutral monism’ is used in many ways (most of which appear to be ultimately 
panpsychist or ‘idealist’). But there’s one central straightforwardly ontological way of 
understanding what it is given which it can be proved to be impossible for independent 
reasons. It’s ruled out by Sein ist Sosein. Sein ist Sosein rules out genuinely ontological 
neutral monism because it states that the existence and nature of a thing isn’t really distinct 
from the existence and nature of its intrinsic propertiedness. So if E and H really are real 
                                                                                                                                               
27 See Stoljar (2006a). Stoljar points out that I sometimes appeal to radical ignorance in argument, e.g. citing 
‘the silence of physics’ against the view that we have any reason to believe in non-experiential being, and at 
other times reject appeals to radical ignorance in arguments made against me, e.g. when standing up for No 
Radical Emergence. This is true but it is not I think a difficulty. 
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properties of concrete reality, as genuinely ontological neutral monism supposes—it holds 
that they’re really real properties of concrete reality, irreducibly real properties of concrete 
reality, not just appearances of some sort, even if it also holds that they’re not fundamental 
properties of concrete reality—then we can’t suppose that the intrinsic nature of concrete 
reality is ultimately neither E nor H. Concrete reality is really (irreducibly really) both E 
and H on this view. So neutral monism fails given Sein ist Sosein. There is no defensible 
sense in which reality is really made only of the fundamental stuff. The words ‘ultimate’ 
and ‘intrinsic’ can’t help.  
So neutral monism can’t help with the ‘mind-body problem’. So if EH monism is no 
better, as I have argued, it looks as if we must either we go back to dualism, which is not I 
think a serious option, or head in the direction of panpsychism.28 
 
12 Experience Entails an Experiencer 
 
So here I stand—a naturalist materialist monist who’s wondering about the nature of 
concrete reality and who knows that the only general thing he knows for certain about 
concrete reality is that experience exists. I find myself being pushed to acknowledge that 
panpsychism is the most plausible form of monism or indeed materialism. I’m aware that  
 
[21] experience entails an experiencer 
 
so I’m going to have to allow that there are as many experiencers as there are genuinely 
ontologically distinct portions of experience—even though this may appear to make things 
more difficult for me as a fledgling panpsychist. 
 Some philosophers have questioned [21]—wrongly because all experience is necessarily 
experience-for; experience for someone-or-something. Experience is necessarily 
experiencing. It’s necessarily had, felt, experienced by something. In this immoveable 
sense there is necessarily an experiencer whenever there’s experience. So anyone who 
prefers the term ‘panexperientialism’ to the term ‘panpsychism’, on the ground that 
‘panexperientialism’ allows for the possibility that there can be experience without an 
experiencer, has gone wrong (in a way that isn’t endorsed by Hume, it should be said, or by 
Buddhists). Note that to insist that an experience entails an experiencer isn’t to claim that 
the experiencer must be irreducibly ontically distinct from the experience or last longer 
than the experience. It’s not to favour any particular hypothesis about the actual concrete 
realization of the experiencer/experiential-content structure that is provably essential to any 
episode of experience.  
 
13 A Global Replace  
 
                                                                                                                                               
28 In Strawson (2003a, 50) I argue that we could never have good reason to prefer dualism (or any pluralism) 
over monism. 
 18 
So here I am. I already know that the most parsimonious hypothesis compatible with the 
data is that concrete reality—the stuff that realizes the concretely existing structure that 
physics picks up on—is wholly a matter of experience, experiencing, experientiality. 
Experience like ours certainly exists and it follows, given No Jumps or No Radical 
Emergence, that experience must be among the fundamental properties of concrete reality. 
(To try to hold on to non-experiential being by holding that reality is non-experiential in its 
fundamental nature but is nevertheless and at the same time ‘protoexperiential’ seems to be 
to try to paper over a crack in reality with a word. The crack—or chasm—remains 
untouched.) 
So when it comes to considering the question of the fundamental nature of concrete 
reality the choice lies between supposing that both experientiality and some form of non-
experientiality like hylality are among the fundamental properties and supposing that only 
experientiality is. I haven’t been able to make sense of the dual option, compatibly with 
retaining monism, and I don't think there could ever be a good argument for dualism, so 
long as the two stuffs posited by dualism are supposed to interact causally (briefly, I don't 
see what argument could undermine the claim that causal interaction is a sufficient 
condition of same substancehood). So I seem to be forced into panpsychism.  
 Can this last position really be said to be a form of materialism? Surely—the point 
should be familiar by now. Many materialists hold that all concrete being is simply energy 
existing in one form or another—i.e. [1]. The panpsychist proposal is simply that the 
intrinsic nature of this energy is experientiality. The panpsychist hypothesis performs a 
‘global replace’ on physics as ordinarily conceived. In so doing leaves the whole of 
physics—everything that is true in physics—in place. So too for all the other sciences. I’m 
a robust realist about physical reality, the theory of evolution, and so on, but I know of no 
argument that gives us any good reason to suppose that there is any non-experiential 
concrete reality. 
 The claim that experience is all that exists isn’t the incoherent claim that everything that 
exists only in or ‘in’ some mind or other (that’s incoherent because a mind can’t exist only 
in or ‘in’ itself). It has nothing to do with standard idealism or phenomenalism, and it 
certainly isn’t committed to the implausible view that tables and chairs are subjects of 
experience. It leaves the physical world untouched, as ‘out there’, relative to each one of us, 
as it ever was—however inadequate our idea of its Existenzraum or dimensionality.  
 Objection: so there’s no distinction between materialism and what amounts to a form of 
‘absolute idealism’. 
Not if ‘absolute idealism’ strictly implies [B] thing monism; but yes insofar as it’s a 
form of pure panpsychism. I hope you don't think this is comic or absurd, because it looks 
as if it’s materialism’s best guess as to the nature of the concrete reality about which 
physics says many true things. Eddington and Whitehead saw this clearly nearly 100 years 
ago. You don't have to call it ‘materialism’ (‘physicalism’) if  you don't want to. I continue 
to call it ‘materialism’ (‘physicalism’) because, once again, concrete reality understood in 
this way is what physics describes in its own magnificent and highly abstract way and says 
many true things about (e = mc2, the inverse square laws, the periodic table, etc.), things 
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which I take to hold good of everything that concretely exists. 
 Objection: But still—why not suppose that the basic nature of concrete reality is non-
experiential rather than experiential? 
 In that case we face again all the problems posed by No Jumps and No Radical 
Emergence. Suppose those problems solved. Then I reply to your question—‘Why suppose 
that the basic nature of concrete reality is experiential?’—with another question: ‘Why 
suppose that it’s non-experiential—either in its basic nature or in any respect at all?’ What 
evidence is there for the existence of non-experiential reality, as opposed to experiential 
reality? None. There is zero observational evidence for the existence of non-experiential 
reality—even after we allow in a standard realist way that each of us encounters a great 
deal in concrete reality that is not his or her own experience. Nor will there ever be any. All 
there is is one great big wholly ungrounded wholly question-begging theoretical intuition or 
conviction.  
 Objection: There isn’t any evidence that the intrinsic nature of reality is wholly 
experiential either. 
 True—but we know that some of it is experiential. We know it for certain because 
 
[22] In the case of experience,  the having is the knowing.  
 
To have experience is not only to be directly acquainted with the fundamental nature of 
experience—at least in certain respects. It’s also of course to know that the experiential 
exists. The view that there is any non-experiential concrete reality is, by contrast, wholly 
ungrounded. It’s a radically and irredeemably verification-transcendent belief. Hume knew 
this. So did many others, including Quine, who famously judged that physical objects that 
are assumed to be non-experiential are “posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods 
of Homer” (Quine 1981, 44) 
 
14 Ignorance and Repugnance  
 
Objection: It’s an old point that there’s an evident and fundamental ‘repugnance’ or 
incompatibility between the spatial on the one hand and the conscious or experiential on the 
other. We encounter things in space, we know them to be in space, and since we have 
powerful reasons, given the repugnance, for thinking that spatial things can’t in themselves 
be experiential things, or at least can’t be wholly experiential things, we have decisive 
evidence that there is non-experiential reality. 
 This issue arose in §10. One doesn’t have to agree with Kant that space isn’t ultimately 
real, but just a ‘form of sensible intuition’, to grant that we may be very ignorant of the 
nature of space or spacetime. The intuition of knowable repugnance went south long ago. It 
was understandable in the seventeenth century, the age of classical contact mechanics, but 
it doesn’t look very good in the twenty-first. We know the experiential is real and we also 
know—about as well as we know anything in science—that it’s literally located in the 
brain: 
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[23] human experience is neural activity. 
 
This is by now far beyond reasonable doubt. So we know, about as well as we know 
anything in science, that the spatial can be experiential—given that the world is spatial. 
And in the present state of our knowledge we have to treat ‘space’ and ‘spacetime’ as 
names for some real dimensionality whose nature we aren’t clear about, although we know 
that it must be such as to allow the existence of experientiality.  
 What can we say in general about this dimensionality, given that pure panpsychism is the 
most parsimonious hypothesis about the nature of concrete reality? Not much but not 
nothing. As pure panpsychists we may take it that (a) the dimensionality of the concrete 
real, however ill understood by us, is something that fits smoothly with (b) the nature of the 
concrete real conceived of as nothing but experientiality in exactly the same way as the way 
in which (c) the dimensionality of the concrete real understood as spatial in the 
conventional way is seen to fit smoothly with (d) the nature of the concrete real understood 
as good old fashioned non-experientially propertied extended physical stuff (plainly any 
difficulty lies in the idea of space, not of time). 
 It may be said that we must retain the idea of dimensional position, even when we figure 
the dimensionality of the concrete real as something that fits smoothly with the idea that the 
concrete real is wholly experiential, because the idea of position and difference of position 
is essentially built into the idea of dimensionality. It may then be said that the property of 
having some dimensional position, at least, is something essentially non-experiential. But 
this may be readily granted because it raises no difficulty for the idea that the whole 
intrinsic nature of the concrete real is a matter of experientiality.  
 We find it quite incredibly hard to think clearly about these things, as Russell stressed. 
Almost all of us are in his words “guilty, unconsciously and in spite of explicit disavowals, 
of a confusion in [our] imaginative picture of reality” (Russell 1927, 382). Even when we 
admit and dwell on our ignorance—even perhaps, when we have seen the force of the 
argument that all that concretely exists is the wave function—we tend to revert to a 
conviction that we have a basic grasp on things that allows us to be sure that the 
matter/energy whose spatiotemporal manifestations are all around us couldn't literally be 
nothing but experientiality. 
 
15 Pictures of Matter 
 
There’s no direct remedy for this. But there are some mental exercises one can perform. It’s 
helpful to keep a few well known physical facts vividly in mind and constantly remind 
oneself of them when facing the ‘mind-body problem’. Consider first the fact that the 
spatial volume occupied by one’s brain—equivalent to the volume of a sphere about five 
inches across—is, intuitively, almost completely empty. (More accurately, it’s almost all 
‘quantum vacuum’ and is arguably a plenum, like all spacetime, i.e. the precise opposite of 
a vacuum; while still being, intuitively, amost completely empty.) Add the fact that it 
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contains about 100 billion non-neuronal cells, although it’s almost completely empty, and 
an approximately equal number of neuronal cells that have up to a thousand trillion 
synaptic connections between them—plus the fact that about 700 billion solar neutrinos 
(and heaven knows what else) pass through it every second. 
 From one intuitively natural perspective matter is quite astoundingly insubstantial, an 
intricately shimmering almost-nothing. And this is so even when we consider a pebble or a 
mountain. When we go on to consider a brain we find many further layers of staggeringly 
intricate organization—in an almost entirely empty space. Such is matter. Such is the 
material brain. It helps to maintain this picture when we’re wondering how experience can 
be physical. It helps to resist the picture of a mammalian brain as a ‘sludgy mass’, a piece 
of meat that can be diced and fried with garlic; although it’s also that. 
 I think it’s also very important to habituate to Wesen ist Werden—the processual view of 
reality. It has to become something more than book learning. The same goes for Sein ist 
Sosein. We need to be able to put aside as far as possible the object-property distinction that 
serves so well in many other areas of philosophy and everyday life but easily leads us into 
an intractably misleading picture according to which, when it comes to the ‘mind-body 
problem’, we have to think first that we have a thing, a physical thing, and then have to 
wonder how such a thing can possibly have experiential properties. 
 The improved picture represents matter soberly and realistically as an almost 
inconceivably sparse shimmering skein of energy, energy-stuff. On one view, this is what 
spacetime is. But insofar as this picture has positive imaginative (quasi-pictorial) content 
for us, it still builds in some version of our ordinary conception or picture of space. And if 
we now try to exert ourselves further imaginatively, in the way philosophy so regularly 
demands, in the attempt to put aside any standard conception or picture of space, we’re 
returned to the ‘epistemic structural realist’ point that we know nothing at all about the 
intrinsic nature of the physical in so far as as its intrinsic nature is more than its 
scientifically detectable structure; except of course, and again, and as always, when we 
have experience. As Russell says: “we know nothing about the intrinsic quality of physical 
events except when these are mental events that we directly experience” (Russell 1956, 
153). 
 We have then to allow again that our picture of space may be entirely misleading. This 
doesn’t prevent us from appreciating the extraordinary insubstantiality of the physical, even 
if we can’t shake off the conventional spatial imaginings that come with it. But those who 
(like my former self) can’t shake their commitment to the idea that we know what space is 
in some truly fundamental and Moorean respect may simply be unable to engage fully with 
the ‘mind-body problem’.   
 
16 Fungibility  
 
We know experience exists. We’ve assumed that stuff monism is true and that everything is 
physical. It seems that  
 
 22 
[24] there is no good reason to believe that anything non-experiential exists29 
 
because there’s zero evidence for the existence of non-experiential reality. One thing we 
now need to consider is the idea that 
 
[25] all physical stuff is fungible 
 
in the sense that any form of it can in principle be transformed into any other—so that if for 
example one broke hydrogen down into leptons and quarks one could reassemble it as 
gold.30 If this is so then it seems plausible to suppose that all physical stuff can potentially 
be part of what constitutes—is—experientiality like ours in living conscious brains like 
ours, i.e. that 
 
[26] all physical stuff can constitute (be) experientiality, experiential being. 
 
And if so, then—given [8] that there is no radical emergence, given that one can’t get the 
experiential out of the non-experiential by any kind of re-arrangement of the non-
experiential—it seems we can advance from [24], according to which there is no good 
reason to believe that anything non-experiential exists, to 
 
[27] we have good reason to believe that nothing non-experiential exists. 
 
But never mind [27] which does after all rely on [8]. The weaker [24] is enough for now. 
One of the most important experiences that a philosopher brought up in the (recent) 
Western tradition can undergo is the realization that [24] is true: the belief in irreducibly 
non-experiential reality has no respectable foundation, even given a fully realist 
commitment to belief in an external world of tables and chairs—a world that exists wholly 
independently of one’s own mind and one’s experiences—and a conviction that physics and 
cosmology—and indeed the other sciences—get a very great deal right about the nature and 
structure of reality. The experience is life-changing, philosophically.  
 It’s natural for many to think that it is nevertheless essentially theoretically cheaper to 
suppose that the fundamental nature of concrete reality is non-experiential—rather than 
splurging on universal experientiality. But this is simply a mistake. The postulation of 
                                                                                                                                               
29 This is not the unintelligibility claim made by Berkeley (1710; see Foster 1982 and Robinson 2009), 
according to which the notion of the non-experiential is wholly unintelligible: I’m happy to allow that the 
general notion of non-experiential reality is wholly intelligible. 
30 I don't know if this is unrestrictedly true; one contrary line of thought runs as follows. It seems plain that [1] 
experientiality has something essentially to do with electricality—in our world at least, and perhaps in all 
possible worlds. One might accordingly suppose that [2] all electricality is experientiality, and perhaps also 
that [3] all experientiality is electricality. One might then hypothesize that [4] ultimate constituents of reality 
lacking electricality (chargeless particles—neutrinos, photons, ‘chameleons’) are intrinsically non-
experiential and can’t directly constitute (be) experientiality, and that fungibility fails between ultimate 
constituents of reality possessing electricality and ultimate constituents lacking it.  
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fundamental non-experientiality not only commits one to something for whose existence 
there is no evidence; it also commits one to belief in radical emergence. It’s far more 
expensive, theoretically speaking. 
 
17 No Mystery  
 
Many say that experience (consciousness) is a mystery. But what is mysterious? We know 
what experience is. We know exactly what certain types of experiences are simply in 
having them. More precisely: we know exactly what certain types of experiences are 
considered specifically in respect of what they’re like for us experientially. And, again, we 
not only know in this way what particular types of experience are. We also know what 
experience is generally considered—even though we have direct experience only of certain 
limited kinds of experience (cf. Sprigge 1999). 
 ‘We know exactly what certain types of experiences are considered specifically in 
respect of what they’re like for us experientially.’ The ‘considered as’ qualification makes 
room for the idea that our experiences have some further intrinsic nature that transcends 
what we know in knowing their phenomenological character in having them. It seems 
wise—necessary—to allow for this, given that experiences are neural goings-on, and given 
all the wonderfully precise numerical things physics and neurophysiology can say about 
them considered as things whose existence involves subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, 
individual cells, and so on. We needn’t however suppose that any aspect of the being of our 
experiences that transcends what we know of their being simply in having them involves 
anything non-experiential. The (pure) panpsychist proposal is precisely that all the 
subatomic, atomic, molecular and cellular energy phenomena about which physics and 
neurophysiology say true and extraordinarily precise numerical things are themselves 
experiential phenomena—microexperiential phenomena. 
 Call these microexperiential phenomena Es. Es may have phenomenological features of 
which we have no knowledge, in having the kinds of experiences we have, even though 
they somehow jointly wholly constitute our experiences. The energy that is an electron is 
wholly a matter of experiencing, on the present view, but the specific phenomenological 
character of this experiencing may be radically unimaginable by us. This doesn’t change 
the fact that we know its nature in a fundamental general way. We do, because we know 
what experience is in a fundamental general way simply in having experience. The 
psychophysics (to give this term a new use—the point is that physics is psychics) of the 
universe is mysterious to us; we don't know how it is that energy is experientiality. But in 
God’s physics asking how it is that energy is experientiality may be like asking how it is 
that energy is energy and there is, for all our ignorance, a fundamental sense in which we 
know the nature of the stuff out of which everything is made in knowing what 
experientiality is.31 
                                                                                                                                               
31 It may be doubted whether there is any robust sense in which an electron is a genuinely individual or 
persisting thing. On one reading, relativistic quantum field theory has it that the phenomena that lead us to 
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 I don't know anything about the Laws of Experiential Combination that govern the way 
Es constitute macroexperiential phenomena like human and canine experience. On one 
view Es undergo radical fusion in such a way that there’s nothing more to their experiential 
being—hence their being tout court—than what we experience in having experiences. I 
don't see how this can be so, because phenomenological being is all there is to the being of 
experiences, according to pure panpsychism, and the complexity revealed by physics and 
neurophysiology isn’t phenomenologically given in our experience. On another fusion-like 
view the fundents (the fundentia, the elements that fuse) somehow continue to possess their 
own intrinsic experiential character even as they unite in such a way as to jointly constitute 
experience like ours. One hypothesis is that these fusions or unities are what show up as 
gusts—waves, bursts—of synchronized activity in the brain. Perhaps they involve massive 
quantum entanglement effects or other strongly unificatory phenomena that can be 
identified as such by physics even though physics can characterize them only in non-
experiential terms. I don't know. What I do know is that we can’t demand more 
intelligibility from the Laws of Experiential Combination (experiential chemistry) than we 
demand from quantum mechanics and physics in general. 
 What remains is the respect in which there is no fundamental mystery if panpsychism is 
true—even though we have no idea how the macroexperiential arises out of the 
microexperiential. Radical mystery is introduced only by the hypothesis that the intrinsic 
non-structural nature of matter is (i) non-experiential (hylal), at least in part, and hence 
radically distinct from anything we know in knowing what experience is, and is 
furthermore (ii) of such a nature that we are utterly unable to see how how it relates 
ontologically to experience (the ‘explanatory gap’).32 We have, again, no idea of the 
intrinsic non-structural nature of the physical insofar as the physical is something other than 
the experiential, except insofar as we know that it is something that exemplifies the 
structures that physics detects.33 The point is not just that the numbers and equations of 
physics don't capture the whole basic or essential nature of reality; it’s that they tell us 
nothing about the intrinsic nature of concrete reality insofar as its intrinsic nature is more 
than its structure. 
The fact that physics is full of mystery—things we can’t claim to understand at all—is 
universally conceded quite independently of this point. Bohr, Einstein, Feynman, Penrose, 
Schrödinger, Wheeler all agree. No doubt the experiential is a mystery relative to physics. 
But to be a mystery relative to physics is to be a mystery relative to a mystery; and if 
something is a mystery relative to a mystery it may not itself be a mystery. It may be that 
it’s only relative to a mystery that it looks like a mystery. And the point that physics is 
silent about the intrinsic nature of the physical, insofar as the intrinsic nature of the physical 
                                                                                                                                               
talk in terms of particles are simply manifestations of the quantization of the energy of fields, and aren’t well 
thought of as entities that can be said to endure over any significant period of time. 
32 See Leibniz 1704, §17, Levine 1983. 
33 Russell writes that “we know nothing about the intrinsic quality of physical events except when these are 
mental events that we directly experience” (Russell 1956, 153). Unlike Russell, I take a concrete thing’s 
structural nature to be part of its intrinsic nature. 
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is more than its structure, is entirely general. It has nothing specially to do with experience. 
It holds equally on the supposition that the intrinsic (non-structural) nature of the physical 
is wholly non-experiential. So there’s no special puzzle or problem in the fact that physics 
finds no place for experience (consciousness). It finds no place for any positive 
characterization of the intrinsic non-structural features of concrete reality. “If you want a 
concrete definition of matter it is no use looking to physics” (Eddington: 1928: 95). 
 
18 Occam  
 
So what should we real materialists do—if and when we try to do metaphysics? Like many 
I think we should start from something we know to exist and whose nature we know—the 
human experiential. It’s beyond reasonable doubt that human experience is wholly a matter 
of neural goings-on and it seems no less clear that the most parsimonious scientific 
hypothesis about the nature of physical reality is that everything is experiential.  
 The experiential starting point isn’t chosen for reasons of epistemological or ontological 
caution. It's just that it’s usually best to start from something one knows to exist if one 
wants to try to give an account of how things are. I’m not particularly cautious when it 
comes to metaphysics. I’d postulate non-experiential reality in a flash if I could see how 
postulating it could help in any way with any problem in real metaphysics or make a 
contribution to any view of how things are that we have any good reason to believe. As 
remarked, it’s scientific orthodoxy that concrete reality consists entirely of energy. The 
present proposal, once again, is simply that the intrinsic nature of the energy is 
experientiality. I’m ready to change my mind if someone can show me that the hypothesis 
that the energy phenomena that physics studies have some intrinsic non-experiential nature 
is superior to the hypothesis that their intrinsic non-structural nature is wholly 
experiential—perhaps by showing some special difficulty in the hypothesis that they are 
wholly experiential. As far as I can see, however, there isn’t a scintilla of a reason for 
postulating anything non-experiential. Occam’s razor, according to which one shouldn’t as 
a theorist posit more entities than one needs to explain the data, 
 
[28] entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem 
 
slices away the non-experiential even if one is an all-out external-world realist. 
 
19 The Combination Problem 
 
This is naturalist monist ‘global replace’ materialist panpsychism. It denies the existence of 
something for which there is no evidence, i.e. non-experiential reality (eliminating the need 
to postulate radical emergence), even as it admits to being clueless about how biological 
(e.g. mammalian) experientiality emerges (non-radically) from the overall energy-
experientiality of the fundamental constituents of brains. 
 At this point real-materialist opponents of panpsychism bring up the so-called 
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combination problem.34 They accept [10] monism, and [11]/[12] real realism about 
experience. They believe [13]/[14] that the equations and numbers of physics cotton on 
accurately to something real. And they endorse [D] ‘smallism’. They also grant—indeed 
insist—that [21] every distinct experience necessarily involves a subject. 
It’s the last two claims that directly underlie the combination problem. The central idea is 
that a group of distinct experiencings or patches of experientiality, each of which 
necessarily has its own subject, can’t physical objects to constitute or generate a single 
experience with a single subject. Why not? Simply because  
 
[E] a plurality of subjects can’t possibly combine to form or generate a single subject. 
 
 If [E] could be proved true, I’d give up [D], which is highly questionable, according to 
certain leading conceptions of physics and cosmology. But as things stand I see no good 
reason to accept [E] even given [D]. When I figure matter as a shimmering skein of 
energy/experientiality as best as I can; when I factor in my imperfect lay grasp of the 
phenomena of quantum entanglement and the extraordinary difficulties that arise when it 
comes to questions of synchronic and diachronic identity in fundamental physics; when I 
factor in my imperfect grasp of the fundamentality of field-theoretic conceptions of those 
phenomena that lead us to talk in an arguably misleading way of ‘particles’; when I form an 
imaginative picture of small patches of local influence fusing into larger transient local 
patches (adding, perhaps, a flavouring of dark energy and dark matter)—I can’t feel any 
deep difficulty in the subject combination problem.35 Once again, we can’t expect the Laws 
of Experiential Combination to be more open to human understanding than the laws of 
quantum mechanics. 
 Nor can I feel any deep difficulty in the ‘grain problem’—the fact that “there seems to be 
a profound structural mismatch between the contents of one’s consciousness at any given 
time, and what science would tell us is simultaneously going on in the brain” (Lockwood 
2003, 453).36 So too, when I consider the two groups of three parameters that account for 
all the colours and sounds, or the five that account for all the tastes, or the combinatorial 
possibilities of leptons and quarks—the astonishing variety of stuffs (lead, neurons, 
marshmallow) they constitute—I feel no difficulty in what Chalmers has called the ‘palette 
problem’ (Chalmers this volume): the numerical gap between the relatively small number of 
fundamental entities postulated in the standard model of physics and the seemingly vast 
number of different types of experiences.37 
 The basic point is simple. [1] We have no good grounds for thinking that we know 
                                                                                                                                               
34 The combination problem was clearly stated by Lucretius two thousand years ago (Lucretius 50, 2.865-
972). See also Clarke (1707–1718), James (1890, ch. 6), Goff (2006), Chalmers (this volume), and Coleman 
(this volume).  
35 See Seager’s discussion of ‘combinatorial infusion’ (Seager 2010) 
36 See also Lockwood (1993). For one interesting form of reply to the ‘grain problem’, see Stoljar (2006b, 
117-18).  
37 I’m mindful, also, of Turausky’s suggestion that particular experiences may be formed by subtraction—
reduction—sculpting—of a base of experiential ‘white noise’ (see Turausky unpublished). 
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enough about the physical to have good reason to think that these problems are serious 
difficulties for panpsychism.38  [2] More positively: we have strikingly good grounds for 
thinking that many of our intuitions of irreducible ontological separateness and distinctness 
are profoundly mistaken. [3] The problems that arise for a physicalism that postulates 
fundamental non-experiential reality and so rejects panpsychism are far greater than the 
problems that arise for panpsychism (e.g. zero evidence for non-experiential reality, 
contravention of No Jumps and No Radical Emergence). 
 I also believe (with Descartes, pre-Critical Kant, and many others, including William 
James) that there’s a metaphysically primordial way of thinking about what a subject of 
experience is given which there is, in the case of any particular episode of experiencing, no 
real distinction between the subject of experience or experiencer and the experience or 
experiencing (see e.g. Strawson 2003b). This may contribute to my failure to feel worried 
by the combination problem. I don't, however, think that this particular belief is 
indispensable to the lack of worry—except insofar as it’s linked to the Sein ist Sosein claim. 
 And now a further question arises. The idea that there’s nothing but experiential reality is 
supposed to give rise to certain distinctive problems; but how can the supposition that there 
is non-experiential reality improve things?39 It may be said that it does remove the 
supposed ‘combination problem’. But I’ve already lost any sense that we have good reason 
to think that this is a serious difficulty, and the problem of how pluralities of distinct non-
experiential processes can combine to form necessarily single-subject-involving 
experiencings like your and my current experience looms no less large, given that it 
requires (among other things) radical emergence of the experiential from the non-
experiential. 
 
20 The Primacy of Panpsychism  
 
I’m not claiming to know that there is no non-experiential reality. I’m just considering the 
most plausible scientific hypothesis—‘global replace’ real materialist panpsychism—and 
wondering why the self-styled hard-nosed naturalists of our day (a) deny the existence of 
something that knowably exists and (b) assume the existence of something for which they 
have no evidence: non-experiential reality. My bet is that  
 
[29] everything is experiential 
 
– that the intrinsic (non-structural) nature of the energy that is widely agreed to wholly 
constitute physical reality is experientiality. 
 I can’t prove this, of course. Some will think that the combination of [7] No Jumps and  
                                                                                                                                               
38 Remember that these proponents of the combination problem hold that the experiential is wholly physical—
or at least, as monists, that it is wholly of the same stuff as whatever stuff they postulate. 
39 Perhaps the best move at this point is Coleman’s (see e.g. this volume). Note, though, that the kind of 
phenomenally qualitied non-experiential reality he posits is very far from any standard conception of non-
experiential being—and that the problem posed by No Radical Emergence remains as acute as ever.  
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[28] Occam’s Razor is very close to proof but I’m content to argue for something weaker—
for  
 
[30] the primacy of panpsychism 
 
as advertised at the outset—the view that  
 
[30] we should favour panpsychism over all other substantive theories of the fundamental 
nature of reality. 
 
It’s not the only game in town, when it comes to speculating about the ultimate nature of 
reality—unless William of Occam is the Sheriff—but it’s the best theory we have. 
 
21 Awareness of Awareness; the World-Knot  
 
I’ll end with a very brief, more positive, and much more speculative thought. It begins with 
Aristotle, at least in the Western tradition, who observes that “if we are aware, we are 
aware that we are aware” (Nicomachean Ethics 9.9.1170a29-b1).40 I’m going to take this 
claim to be correct in saying that all experience, all awareness, as I’ll now also call it—
using ‘awareness’ to refer only to conscious awareness and taking it to be synonymous with 
‘experience’ used as above—somehow or other involves awareness of that very awareness.  
This can be read in at least two ways, as is well known: in a higher-order way and a 
same-order ‘self-intimationist’ way. I favour the same-order view, the view that  
 
[31] all awareness on the part of a subject comports awareness, on the part of that subject, 
of that very awareness 
 
where ‘comports’ is used to mean something like (and at least) ‘contains within itself’ (as 
in French comporter); so that the awareness of awareness isn’t anything ontically over and 
above the awareness considered as a whole.  
We can rewrite [31] more simply as 
 
[31] all awareness comports awareness of that very awareness. 
 
I’ll call this the Self-Intimation thesis. 
 
There’s an enormous quantity of discussion of this matter. I’m not going to add to it here.41 
I’m simply going to endorse the Self-Intimation thesis in order to propose a further Very 
                                                                                                                                               
40 See also De Anima 425b12-25. It is I believe a mistake to read the explicitly propositional formulation 
‘aware that we are aware’ in such a way that the claim isn’t also true of non-human animals. 
41 See e.g. Zahavi (1999; 2005), Kriegel and Williford (2006). I try to characterize it in Strawson (2015).  
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Large Step: perhaps the self-intimation—the fundamental self-reflexivity, the 
Fürsichsein—characteristic of experience is of the essence not only of experience—mind, 
consciousness—but of all concrete being. Perhaps it’s only this kind of turnedness-on-itself 
that can catapult or bootstrap being into being. This would explain why Sein—
Ansichsein—is Fürsichsein: there is no other possibility: 
 
[32] all concrete reality is necessarily experiential.  
 
Catapulting and bootstrapping are bad metaphors insofar as they suggest that experience is 
somehow causa sui—the cause of itself. I don’t think anything can be causa sui. A thing 
can be somehow self-sustaining, perhaps, but not self-caused. Slightly better, perhaps, is 
the proposal that this sort of self-reflexivity or self-relatedness or self-intimation is an 
internal sprungness—a self-sprungness—that characterizes not only awareness but being in 
general. It’s what holds off its collapse into nothing (as it were). It is perhaps one good way 
to characterize what energy is, and the whole of concrete being is energy in one form or 
another: Stoff ist Kraft. 
 This perhaps is the real ‘world-knot’—Schopenhauer’s term for the point of contact 
between subject and world. It really is a kind of knot inasmuch as a knot is essentially 
turned on itself. This perhaps is the real remarkableness of experience as it emerges in our 
attempt to theorize about it. And it’s nothing other than the remarkableness of concrete 
being. 
 This is entirely speculative. The notion of being self-sprung is metaphorical. But I think 
that something about it smells right—the idea that the ‘self-sprungness’ or ‘self-intimation’ 
of experience is the fundamental form or self-sustaining structure of the energy which is 
concrete reality. Self-sprungness makes—constitutes—force, and Stoff ist Kraft. Matter—
more generally, the physical, all concrete being—is force or activity or power or energy. 
Matter-force is essentially dynamic, being is essentially becoming: Wesen ist Werden. We 
travel smoothly down the chain of terms which—it now appears—forms a circle: a 
panpsychist circle. We already know that we neither have nor can have any good reason to 
think that anything non-experiential exists in concrete reality and we’ve now noted a 
fundamental feature of experience—a kind of self-loopedness that seems uniquely 
characteristic of experience—that offers itself as a fundamental feature of any kind of 
concrete being at all. With Eddington, Russell, Whitehead, and many others, including 
Spinoza and Leibniz, and perhaps Kant, and many others, I suspect we’re wrong to think 
that awareness or Fürsichsein is a special—rare—feature of the universe. On the present 
view it’s the most common thing there is. In fact it’s the only kind of thing there is. All 
being in-itself, i.e. all being, all being period, is being for-itself. This is an essential part of 
its intrinsic or ultimate nature. This is what energy is, the energy treated of in physics, the 
energy of which matter is one form among others, and about whose intrinsic nature, over 
and above its structural nature, physics has, provably and forever, nothing to say. 
 “Apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare 
nothingness” (Whitehead 1929, 167). I don't know exactly why Whitehead came to this 
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conclusion, but we know—to say it one more time—that experience exists in the universe, 
and we don’t know that anything else exists. This isn’t any sort of argument that nothing 
non-experiential exists, but all those who are genuinely committed to monism ought to 
prefer the hypothesis that everything is experiential to all hypotheses that suppose that the 
fundamental nature of reality is wholly non-experiential because all these hypotheses 
require that one posit radical emergence. They require experiential phenomena to emerge 
from phenomena that are in themselves wholly and utterly non-experiential. Long 
familiarity with a picture according to which experientiality emerged from non-
experientiality in the course of biological evolution has softened our thinking in such a way 
that we can no longer clearly see what an extravagant hypothesis this is—especially for 
someone who is convinced, as I am, of the truth of the theory of evolution.42,43   
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